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Abstract
Prepared for Special Issue of Economic Modelling in honor of
P.A.V.B. Swamy.
This paper uses a large panel of data with up to 19 time-series ob-
servations for almost 150 countries to estimate models of arms imports.
Qualitative evidence suggest a non-linear relationship. As income and
military expenditure grow, the propensity to import rst rises and
then falls as a domestic arms industry develops. We face the di¢ -
culty that there is virtually no data on domestic arms procurement
or production capability. We try to avoid this di¢ culty by adopt-
ing a random coe¢ cient approach in order to identify any systematic
inuences on import propensity, through the impact of military ex-
penditure, size of the armed forces or income on unobserved domestic
production capability. While a clear non-linear pattern is apparent in
the cross-section relationship, once one allows for parameter hetero-
geneity such a pattern is not apparent in the time-series.
J.E.L. Classication: C23, C24, D74
Keywords: Sample selection, arms imports, random parameters.
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1 Introduction
The random coe¢ cient model, RCM introduced by Swamy (1970), has been
widely used in panels where one has data over units, such as countries, i =
1; 2; ::; N; for a fairly large number of time periods t = 1; 2; :::; T . The
RCM estimator can be calculated as a weighted average of the coe¢ cients
estimated for each unit and has the advantage that it introduces a focus
on coe¢ cient heterogeneity at the initial stage of modelling. The empirical
experience with large T panels is that the dispersion of coe¢ cient estimates
over units is not only large, but implausibly large. Baltagi and Gri¢ n (1997),
among many others, note this and the fact that pooled or averaged estimators
(such as the Swamy RCM or the mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith
(1995)) tend to be much more reasonable. Similarly, using a panel of N = 57
countries with T = 31 annual observations Boyd and Smith (2002) estimate
purchasing power parity equations where one would expect the the elasticity
of the exchange rate to price di¤erentials to be close to unity. They nd
a range from -0.40 to 2.47 in static levels regression and from -2.21 to 7.93
for long-run estimates in a rst order dynamic model. The dispersion is not
reected in measured sampling variability and the range is not substantially
reduced by removing insignicant coe¢ cients or shrinking the coe¢ cients
toward the mean. Boyd and Smith interpret the heterogeneity in terms
of omitted variables, unobserved factors which bias the coe¢ cient for any
particular unit. However, since the correlation between the included and
omitted variables is not structural, it averages to zero over time and units,
producing reasonable estimates for the average e¤ect.
Omitted variables are only one possible form of misspecication. As
Swamy has emphasised in subsequent work, e.g. in Hall et al, (2009), there
are also measurement errors, endogeneity problems, structural breaks and
non-linearities which could cause coe¢ cients to di¤er over countries. The
e¤ect of the non-linearity, which will be one focus of our concern, is that
di¤erent units, observed at di¤erent values of the explanatory variables, pro-
vide di¤erent linear approximations to an underlying non-linear function.
The procedure Hall et al. (2009) suggest is to rst estimate a model with
coe¢ cients that are allowed to vary as a result of the fundamental misspec-
ications in the model, and, then, to identify the specication biases that
are occuring in the underlying coe¢ cients and remove them.They focus on
coe¢ cient instability over time, in this paper we follow a similar procedure,
but focus on coe¢ cient instability over units in a large panel.
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Misspecication seems likely in the example we examine. The aim is to
explain arms imports in a large panel of countries as a function of the coun-
tries military expenditures and other variables. The data are very noisy,
with missing values, zeros and severe problems of measurement error, non-
linearity and ommitted variables. The data are bad partly because there
are strong incentives, both on the demand and the supply side, to misreport
weapons transfers and many transfers, particularly of small arms and light
weapons are illicit and unrecorded. Even where there is no intention to de-
ceive, there are problems in dening arms imports, particularly for dual use
items that can have military or civil uses. For instance, Iceland has no armed
forces or military expenditures but has recorded arms imports, because sup-
pliers regard some of the equipment supplied, e.g. for the coast guard, as
military. Contracts can be complex involving spares, training and facilities as
well as the systems themselves; there is often little information on prices or
payments which may involve bribes and other corrupt practices and counter-
trade (barter). The contracts often include o¤sets, promises by the exporter
to set up production facilities in the importing country. In the estimated
equations, there are almost certainly omitted explanatory variables such as
domestic arms production capability and geostrategic factors, both of which
are di¢ cult to measure.
There is also likely to be a fundamental non-linearity in the relationship.
Poor countries tend not to import major weapons systems, since they cannot
a¤ord them and the conicts they are involved in, primarily civil wars, usually
involve small arms, which are of low value and often domestically produced.
Donors and international nancial institutions also disapprove of expensive
arms imports by poor countries.1 As countries become richer and spend
more on the military they import more major weapons systems, but beyond
a certain size they are likely to establish a domestic arms industry which
they protect for strategic reasons, thus reducing imports. The US, the biggest
military spender, imports relatively little. Thus one might expect an inverted
U shape relationship, as the elasticity of arms imports rises and then falls with
the level of military expenditure or income. While one might expect non-
linearity, previous work has not revealed a clear pattern. The non-linearity
is apparent in cross-section estimates, e.g. in Levine et al. (1998), but not in
the panels examined in our earlier paper, Smith and Tasiran (2005), referred
1The negative response by the World Bank and others to the Tanzanian purchase of an
expensive UK military air tra¢ c control system from BAE is illustrative in this respect.
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to as ST below.
When confronted with such noisy panels, applied investigators have a
number of choices in selecting the samples used for estimation. One route is
to choose to ignore some of the data, working with a balanced panel using
a smaller sample of better quality data. A second route is to use all the
data, imputing observations for missing values; and trying to allow for the
sample selection bias that comes from ignoring missing or zero values and the
coe¢ cient heterogeneity that comes from misspecication. In ST, we chose
the rst route, considering a small balanced panel of better quality data with
19 time-series observations for each of 52 countries, ignoring the data for
almost a hundred other countries. This paper examines the implications of
choosing the second route: using all the data, trying to model the coe¢ cient
heterogeneity, and investigating the possible non-linearity within a random
coe¢ cient framework.
In Section 2, we discuss the random coe¢ cient models. In section 3 we
provide some background on the arms trade and the two data sources, SIPRI
and WMEAT. We have imputed data for cases where there are data from one
source but not the other, details of how this is done is given in Tasiran and
Smith (2009). We then adopt two quite di¤erent approaches to the data. In
Section 4, we follow ST and estimate demand functions for arms imports on
this larger data set allowing for possible sample selection bias, but assuming
quite a lot of coe¢ cient homogeneity. As long as country xed e¤ects are
included in both the selection and regression equations, sample selection bias
does not appear to be a serious problem. However, the results for the whole
sample of countries are rather di¤erent from those from the smaller balanced
sample of countries. In section 5 we estimate simpler random coe¢ cient
models allowing for considerable coe¢ cient heterogeneity to explore the ex-
tent to which the di¤erences in coe¢ cients can be explained by non-linearity.
Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Random Coe¢ cient Models
Hisao and Pesaran (2008) provide a review of random coe¢ cients models,
here we consider some aspects that are relevant for our investigation. Con-
sider a heterogeneous panel model:
yi =Wii + ui (1)
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where yi is a T  1 vector, and Wi is a T  k vector of strictly exogenous




, if i = j, E(i
0
j) = 0 otherwise, and that the i are
independent of Wi. As Pesaran, Haque and Sharma (2000) emphasise this
assumption of the independence of the randomly varying parameters from
the regressors is crucial and we return to it.2 There are a large number of
estimators for   E(i), the expected value of the random coe¢ cients. The
simplest is to compute the OLS estimates for each group3:
bi = (W0iWi) 1W0iyi (2)
and then construct the average =
P
i





(bi )(bi )0=(N   1) (3)
Pesaran and Smith (1995) call  the Mean Group, MG, estimator. Its esti-
mated covariance matrix is V () = b
=N:
Swamy (1970) suggests a feasible generalised least squares, GLS, estima-
tor, which is equivalent to using a weighted average of the individual OLS
estimates bi instead of the MG unweighted average. Using the residuals and
the unbiased estimate of the variance
bui = yi  Wibi; s2i = bu0ibui=(T   k);
respectively, the estimated covariance of bi is
V
bi = s2i (W0iWi) 1 :
Swamy suggests estimating 







2In the static models considered in this paper, the assumption of independence ensures
that all the estimators considered are unbiased. This result does not carry over to dynamic
models as emphasised by Pesaran and Smith (1995).
3There are also a range of simulation based, parameteric, random coe¢ cient models
which involve assuming some distribution for the coe¢ cients but do not require estimat-
ing the coe¢ cient for each group. We do not consider these, since we have little prior
knowledge of the appropriate distribution in our case.
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However, e
 need not be positive denite, and in practice it often is not. In
this case, Swamy suggests setting the last term to zero and using b
; from
(3) as the estimator instead. Notice that although b
 ignores the correction
for the sampling error of bi, it is consistent as T goes to innity, since the
second term in e
 goes to zero. However, the fact that e
 is often not positive
denite indicates that the second term can be very large for small T: b
 is
also a non-parametric estimator, since it just uses the distribution of the
estimated bi; so is robust to any serial correlation or heteroskedasticity in
the ui which would cause the usual estimator of V
bi to be inconsistent.
V
bi measures only sampling variability and not possible misspecication,
so may also under-estimate the uncertainty associated with bi:
The Swamy estimator of the mean is
e = X
i












 1 ; 	i = e
+ V bi :
The predictions of the individual coe¢ cients can be improved by shrinking
the OLS estimates towards the overall estimate:
ei = Qbi + (I  Q) e (6)
Q =
e
 1 + V bi 1 1 e
 1
The Swamy RCM can be interpreted either as a GLS estimator or an empiri-
cal Bayes estimator. Hsiao Pesaran and Tahmiscioglu (1999) review a variety
of Bayes and empirical Bayes estimators of this sort and show that the MG
and the Swamy estimator are aymptotically equivalent and have a standard
asymptotic normal distribution for large N and T as long as
p
N=T ! 0
as both N and T ! 1. However, the MG estimator is unlikely to perform
well when N or T are small since it is very sensitive to outliers which are
a common feature of the group specic estimates in many applications. In
principle, the weighting which the Swamy estimator applies, should reduce
this problem; in practice, it may not, because the misspecication may cause
the outlying estimate to be very precisely estimated and given a large weight.
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bi 1# 1 V bi 1 bi
is a weighted xed e¤ect estimator. This test is not appropriate when N is
large relative to T and Pesaran and Yamagata (2008), PY, propose a variant
of this test which has good properties when N is large relative to T . The
problem with (7) arises because as N increases the number of estimated
variances increases. Rather than using s2i = bu0ibui=(T   k); calculated usingbui the residuals from the individual regressions the PY test uses eui = yi W ibFE in calculating an estimate of 2i which is used both in the test statistic
and the weighted xed e¤ect estimator. Although this may appear a slight
adjustment, it makes a large di¤erence when N is large relative to T:
The focus in panels has traditionally been on the correlation of intercepts
with regressors, but the problem can arise with slope heterogeneity even
when intercept heterogeneity is allowed for. Consider a very simple example,
where:
yit = i + ixit + "it; i = 1; :::; N; t = 1; :::; T: (8)
If one imposes homogeneity of i on (8), e.g. the xed e¤ects model, and
denes i = i   ; one gets
yit = 
0
i + xit + (ixit + "it);
One will get inconsistent estimation of  = E(i) if ixit is correlated with
xit; independence requires that i is uncorrelated with any functions of xit: In
addition any variable correlated with ixit can appear signicant, when added
to this regression. Averaging, rather than imposing homogeneity, avoids this
problem.
In some cases, the heterogeneity in the parameters may stem from ob-
served individual-specic characteristics which do not vary over time, say
zi.
i=0 + 1zi + i;
or
yit = i + 0xit + 1zixit + ixit + "it; (9)
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In cases where zi is correlated with xit, then zixit is correlated with x2it; and it
may be very di¢ cult to distinguish (9) from an apparently non-linear model
yit = i + 0xit + 1x
2
it + uit: (10)
These two models have quite di¤erent predictions for the e¤ect of a change in
xit, either just 0; or (0+21xit): This is a specic case of the more general
issue as to how one distinguishes the e¤ect of variations over time from the
e¤ect of variations over units.
This problem of signicant but spurious non-linearity is discussed in more
detail by Pesaran, Haque and Sharma (2000). In our case, one issue is
whether or not we can determine if the apparent non-linearity in the cross-
section pattern of weapons imports is spurious.
3 Context and data
The arms trade, although small in economic terms, about $40bn a year, is
a sensitive policy issue. Most countries have control systems that regulate
exports of weapons; there are a range of international control measures in-
cluding UN embargoes on the supply of weapons to particular countries;
there are a range of supplier groups to control transfers for conventional
arms (the Wassenaar arrangement), nuclear technology, chemical and bio-
logical weapons and missile technology. General reviews of the economics of
the arms trade can be found in Garcia-Alonso and Levine (2007) and Brauer
(2007). The decision by a country to import arms reects threats, prox-
ied here by its military expenditure; ability to pay, proxied by per capita
income; the labour intensity of its force structure, proxied by armed forces
per capita; and its domestic weapons production capability, for which there
is no obvious proxy. As noted above, there is likely to be a non-linearity,
since as demand for weapons increases, the large xed costs in establishing
domestic production capability are incurred and these substitute for imports.
Establishing production capability takes time, so when weapons are urgently
needed in a crisis, they tend to come from imports. Explaining arms imports
is more di¢ cult than explaining military expenditure because the data are
very lumpy, imports can be small in one year, large in the next as say a
squadron of aircraft are delivered and go back to being small. There are
also a lot of zeros in the full data, where countries did not import at all
or the imports were not measured. Questions of dynamic adjustment are
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potentially important and these are discussed in Smith and Tasiran (2005).
Allowing for slow adjustment did not change the main conclusions there so,
given the short time-series dimension, we will conne our attention to static
models here, though there remains the danger of dynamic misspecication.
There are also obvious issues of endogeneity; since imports, military expen-
ditures and armed forces may be determined simultaneously in the light of
threats. However, given the lack of suitable instruments these issues will not
be pursued.
There are two main sources of comparable international data on arms
imports. The Stockhom International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, reg-
ularly publish estimates in their annual yearbook as did the US government
in the annual World Military Expenditure and arms Transfers, WMEAT,
produced initially by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and
then by the Bureau of Verication and Compliance of the US Department
of State. It has not been published since 2000, hence the end of the sample
period that we use below. SIPRI attempts to measure volume by multiply-
ing an estimate of quantities of major weapons systems transferred by trend
indicator values of unit production costs, irrespective of the price actually
paid. Thus when Germany transferred most of the old East German navy
to Indonesia virtually free, this is still a quantity of weapons transferred and
will be reected as such by the SIPRI measure. WMEAT attempts to mea-
sures the value of arms transfers, reecting an estimate of the price actually
paid. There are thus two di¤erences between the series: valuation (SIPRI is
a quantity measure WMEAT a value measure) and coverage (SIPRI covers
major weapons systems, WMEAT all systems).
In Smith and Tasiran (2005), we estimated dynamic demand functions for
arms imports for a balanced panel of 52 countries and 19 years, 1981-1999,
using cases where there were non-zero observations from both sources for all
years. This approach ignores a large number of observations for countries
where there are missing or zero observations for some years, though the
observations excluded may be of lower quality. The missing observations
may arise because countries disappear, e.g. the Soviet Union, and appear, e.g.
Russia, neither of which were included in our balanced panel. This approach
is also potentially subject to sample selection bias by not taking account of
the zero observations, of which there are many in the whole data set. In this
paper, we investigate the e¤ect of using the whole data set, extending it by
imputation where we have observations on arms imports from one of the two
sources. We also investigate the e¤ect of sample selection bias by examining
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the e¤ect of explicitly modelling the zeros.
One issue is whether arms imports are sensitive to price; the degree of
price sensitivity is important for a range of policy issues. There are no direct
measures of price, but since WMEAT is a value measure and SIPRI a volume
measure, their ratio is an implicit price index. However, it is likely to be a
poor measure and the implications for estimation of the measurement errors
are discussed in ST, which considered a variety of estimators. We feel that
even if the individual estimates of price are bad, they may allow us to estimate
price sensitivity over the whole sample.
We have 2869 observations for 151 countries over 19 years on the depen-
dent variable, though we lose some of these because we do not have data
on covariates. As we extend the data set from the 988 (52x19) observations
used in ST we gain more information but introduce more noise. We gain
more information because the sample of 52 is likely to be biased, countries
which have a full set of observations on arms imports may not be typical of
the whole sample, and because we use the information in the zeros, which
was ignored. We introduce more noise because the countries with less infor-
mation are likely to have larger measurement errors and because the process
of imputation introduces errors. As we extend the sample the estimated
relationship may change either because more or worse data are being used
or because the extra countries we include have a di¤erent process determin-
ing arms imports. We examine this by steadily increasing the sample and
examining the e¤ects on our estimates.
4 Homogeneous Demand Functions
We begin by treating the ratio of the WMEAT to the SIPRI series as a noisy
measure of price and estimate demand functions, comparable with those in
ST, of the form:
sit = i + 1pit + 2mit + 3ypcit + 4afpcit + uit:
Where sit is the logarithm of the SIPRI (quantity) measure of arms imports,
pit the logarithm of price (the ratio of the ACDA to the SIPRI measure),
mi is the logarithm of military expenditure, ypci the logarithm of per-capita
income and afpcit is the logarithm of armed forces per-capita. This di¤ers
from the equation in ST by adding armed forces per capita; although its
coe¢ cient is not signicant for the balanced panel, it is for the whole sample
10
and so the variable is included. The coe¢ cients of the squares of mit and
ypcit or their interaction are not signicant in any of the samples so these
variables are not included. We conne our attention in this section to the
one way xed e¤ect estimator and allow for slope heterogeneity in the next
section. All the standard errors reported are robust to heteroskedasticity,
though not to serial correlation, for which there is some evidence.
We consider four samples. The rst is the balanced sample using only
countries where there are non-zero observations on the dependent variable
for all years. This has 988 observations on 52 countries. The second, which
we will call the extended sample, includes the non-zero observations for the
countries excluded from the balanced panel because of missing observations.
This has 1068 observations covering 94 countries. The third, pooled sample,
combines these two, giving the whole sample excluding zeros, 2056 observa-
tions on 146 countries. The fourth, the whole sample, which includes the
zeros, has 2454 observations on 150 countries. As one might expect the bal-
anced sample is rather di¤erent from the extended sample, having higher
average values for all the variables. Average log arms imports is 4.87 in the
balanced sample compared to 2.62 in the extended; log military expenditure
is 8.06 compared to 5.53; log income per capita is 8.42 compared to 7.23 and
armed forces per capita 1.74 compared to 1.51. When estimating a linear
relationship, if the data generating process is in fact linear, taking samples
from di¤erent parts of the joint distribution does not matter. However if the
underlying relationship is non linear, it does matter, since one gets di¤erent
linear approximations in di¤erent parts of the joint distribution.
Table 1 gives the xed e¤ect estimates for the balanced sample, the ex-
tended sample and the pooled sample. The pooled estimates lie between the
two subsamples, though since the coe¢ cients are matrix weighted averages
there is no requirement that they do so. The e¤ects on the coe¢ cients of log
price are very small: the estimated price elasticities lie between -0.8 and -0.85.
The coe¢ cients of log military expenditure and log armed forces per-capita
di¤er between samples, but do not change the qualitative story. The military
expenditure elasticity rises from 0.54 on the balanced sample to 0.87 on the
extended sample. The elasticity on armed forces per capita rises from 0.2 in
the balanced panel where it is not signicant to 0.45 in the extended sample.
The coe¢ cient on per-capita income is signicantly positive in the balanced
sample and signicantly negative in the extended sample. The di¤erence in
the coe¢ cient of afpcit is not that large between the samples, but the larger
sample reduces its standard error, so where it was excluded as insignicant
11
in ST, with the larger sample it is now signicant. The data that were ex-
cluded from the balanced sample are clearly telling a rather di¤erent story
from that in the balanced sample. The Likelihood ratio statistic for pooling
is 98, which under the null of the same parameters would be 2(4); clearly
rejects pooling the two samples. This test is valid under the assumption that
the variances are the same. While the variances are signicantly di¤erent,
being rather larger in the extended sample the di¤erence is not that large.
Table 1 Fixed e¤ect estimates of the demand function on di¤er-
ent samples, robust standard errors in parentheses.
NoObs pit mit ypcit afpcit R
2 MLL
N SER
Balanced 988  0:812 0:542 0:389 0:232 0:823  1083:55
52 (0:050) (0:018) (0:102) (0:210) 0:746
Extended 1068  0:850 0:874  0:452 0:454 0:824  1425:98
94 (0:037) (0:034) (0:083) (0:091) 0:965
Pooled 2056  0:830 0:794  0:128 0:315 0:864  2558:51
146 (0:027) (0:030) (0:062) (0:068) 0:872
Notes. R2 is the coe¢ cient of determination, SER the standard
error of regression, MLL the maximised log-likelihood.
Including cases where the dependent variable is zero gives 2454 observa-
tions on 150 countries. Treating the zeros as if they were valid observations
would be inappropriate, Wooldridge (2002, ch17) has a discussion of such
sample selection models. Suppose that we have an underlying demand for
the logarithm of the quantity (using the SIPRI measure) of arms imports,
sit; as a function of log o¤ered price, p

it and
sit = i + 
0mit   pit + "it
wheremit is a vector of explanatory variables including military expenditure
and GDP. We only observe imports, sit and prices, pit if sit > 0; i.e. if the
reservation price is greater than the o¤ered price
 1(i + 
0mit + "it) > pit:
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This censors both the dependent variable and an independent variable, price
and there is uncertainty as to whether sit = 0 indicates a true zero or a
missing observation on a non-zero value.
We will consider selection models where di¤erent processes generate the
zeros and non-zeros





sit = i + 
0xit + ("2;it j zit = 1)
where 1(zit > 0) is an indicator function which delivers 1 if the condition
holds, zero otherwise. We only observe sit and one element of xit; price,
when zit = 1; and wit is a vector of variables that we always observe. We
assume that "1;it and "2;it are joint normal, with expected values zero. The
variance of "1;it is normalised to unity, the variance of "2;it is 2 and their
correlation coe¢ cient is . The rst equation is a Probit type selection equa-
tion determining whether arms imports are zero or not, the second selection
corrected regression explains the non-zero observations. Tobit models are a
special case where the same process generates the zeros and non-zeros, but
this seems unlikely in this case: the factors determining whether or not to
buy arms are likely to be di¤erent from the factors determining how many
arms are purchased. As Dustmann and Rochina-Barachina (2007) note there
are relatively few empirical studies using selection models in panels. We will
use both random and xed e¤ect estimators for the i and i:With the linear
panel models above, Hausman tests strongly rejected the hypothesis that the
intercepts are random, so there is a presumption in favour of the xed e¤ects




























There is the di¢ culty that when zit = 1 for all the observations for a country,
which is the case for the 52 countries in our balanced panel, i is not identied
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in the probit xed e¤ect model. A similar problem occurs when zit = 0 for all
observations for a country, though this does not arise in our data. In these
cases the probit terms are just dropped from the Likelihood, it is assumed
that there is a zero probability of no arms imports for these countries, which
seems reasonable. The standard errors are bootstrapped4. For the probit
selection equation it was found that the squares of log military expenditure
and log per-capita income improved the t and they were included.
Table 2. Selection model estimates and (standard errors) for
probit and selection corrected regression.
Random E¤ect Fixed E¤ect
 3:829 (0:277)
mit 0:263 (0:061) 0:032 (0:025)
m2it 0:031 (0:007) 0:015 (0:027)
ypcit  1:37 (0:087)  4:273 (1:31)
ypc2it 0:094 (0:006) 0:387 (0:095)
afpcit  0:009 (0:030) 0:479 (0:016)
 0:114 (0:092)
pit  0:830 (0:007)  0:830 (0:274)
mit 0:570 (0:007) 0:780 (0:272)
ypcit 0:002 (0:011)  0:131 (0:152)
afpcit 0:348 (0:014) 0:304 (0:109)
 0:878 0:841
  0:153 (0:048)  0:123 (0:103)
The estimates for the selection and regression equations are given in Ta-
ble 2. In the random e¤ect model  and  are the means of the random
i and i. In this model the coe¢ cient of armed forces is not signicant
in the selection equation and the coe¢ cient of income not signicant in the
regression equation. In the xed e¤ects model the coe¢ cient of military
expenditure squared is not signicant in the selection equation and the co-
e¢ cient of income per capita in the regression equation. The estimate of 
is similar and quite small in both, but signicant only in the random e¤ects
model. In the regression equation, the random and xed e¤ects estimates
4The estimation was done in the program Limdep which provides further details of
estimation methods.
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of the price elasticity are identical and the coe¢ cients of armed forces quite
close. However in the selection equation the xed and random e¤ects esti-
mates are very di¤erent suggesting that the country intercepts are correlated
with the regressors. The xed e¤ect regression estimates are very close to
those given above for the pooled sample, which indicates that the correction
for the missing zeros makes very little di¤erence once one allows for xed
e¤ects in the selection equation.
5 Heterogeneous Demand Functions
The previous section assumed considerable slope homogeneity, in this section
this assumption is relaxed.To economise on parameters, we assume that the
price elasticity is unity, then the log of the WMEAT measure of expendi-
ture on arms imports, ait can be made a function of military expenditure,
both measured in 1999 US dollars, and of armed forces per capita. Income
per-capita was not signicant in any of the heterogeneous models, though
this may be because of averaging negative and positive e¤ects. Separate
regressions are estimated for each of 131 countries where there were a mini-
mum of six observations, 2228 observations in all, not using sit increases the
observations available.
To illustrate the issue of non-linearity, consider the cross-section, be-
tweenestimator, where the squares of both military expenditure and per-
capita income are included. The estimates (with robust standard errors)
are
ait = 3:066 +1:260 mit  0:037 m2it
(1:56) (0:19) (0:01)
 1:345 ypcit +0:08 ypc2it +0:268 afpcit
(0:45) (0:03) (0:09)
R2 = 0:837; SER = 0:78; N = 131:
The signicant quadratic terms in the cross-section seem to indicate non-
linearity. When the same equation is estimated by xed e¤ects none of
the coe¢ cients are signicant, using robust standard errors; though all but
military expenditure are signicant using conventional standard errors. The
xed e¤ects estimates of the pattern of non-linearity for military expenditure
is the reverse of the cross-section, with mit having a negative coe¢ cient
and m2it a positive one; though the coe¢ cients of income were similar and
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afpcit had a rather larger positive e¤ect. The within group correlation of
the variables seems to make it impossible to determine any non-linearities.
Dropping the squared terms in the xed e¤ect estimator leads to mit and
afpcit being signicant, but not ypcit:
To examine the e¤ect of the treatment of coe¢ cient heterogeneity, various
versions of the simple model
ait = i + imit + iafpcit + uit (11)
were estimated using the cross-section, pooled OLS, one way xed e¤ects,
FE1, two-way xed e¤ects FE2, Swamy RCM and mean group estimators.
Table 3. Alternative estimates of (11)
.
mit (se) afpcit (se)
CS 0:689 (0:045) 0:220 (0:089)
Pool 0:710 (0:014) 0:252 (0:032)
FE1 0:976 (0:076) 0:690 (0:048)
FE2 1:051 (0:060) 0:479 (0:079)
RCM 0:924 (0:200) 0:374 (0:250)
MG 1:008 (0:232) 0:306 (0:310)
Allowing for time e¤ects, reduces ; the coe¢ cient of afpcit; somewhat,
but has little e¤ect on the coe¢ cient of military expenditure, . The MG,
FE and RCM estimates of  are very similar, with the between and pooled
estimates somewhat lower. The two-way FE, MG and RCM estimates of 
are similar and not too far from the between and pooled, the one-way xed
e¤ect estimate is rather higher. The RCM estimates have smaller standard
errors than the MG estimates.
The RCM and MG estimates are averages of country specic coe¢ cients.
Table 4 provides desciptive statistics for the distribution of the 131 individ-
ual country estimates. Although all the distributions of the coe¢ cients are
broadly unimodal they have fat tails and normality is massively rejected by
a skewness-kurtosis test. The strong skew of bi results from some very neg-
ative outliers. One would expect the mean of i to be about unity: imports
are a constant share of military expenditure; the range from -9 to +13 seems
quite implausible. A more reasonable possible range for i might be -1 to
+3 and 91 of the 131 (69%) estimates bi lie in this range. This is rather
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more than the 58% one would expect with a normal distribution, given the
estimated standard deviation. The outliers are not based just on small sam-
ples. If one only considers estimates based on 15 observations or more, the
mean hardly changes and the standard deviation only reduces from 2.65 to
2.42. If one selects on signicance, and only considers the 36 observations
which are signicantly positive at the 5% level, the mean increases to 3.47
with standard deviation 2.99. The range is from 0.5 to 12. Truncating on the
basis of signicance gives a very misleading picture, assuming that the true
mean is around unity. Shrinking the estimates using the Swamy predictions
of the coe¢ cients, from (6) ; helps a little, reducing the range for i to from
-2.08 to 9.06, but this is still larger than any reasonable range.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for the distribution of the coe¢ -
cients, N=131 bi bi bi
Mean 1.008 0.306 -4.781
SD 2.65 3.55 24.51
Min -8.58 -9.60 -183.32
Max 12.62 21.79 42.85
Skew 1.15 2.02 -4.03
Kurt 8.50 15.00 26.98
2(2) 193 874 3493
To examine whether there was any systematic relationship between the
variables and the coe¢ cients, Table 5 gives the correlations for the means of
the variables and the coe¢ cients. Although not an e¢ cient way to estimate
such relationships, it can sometimes be a useful diagnostic. The means of
the variables are highly correlated, all greater than 0.49, in particular be-
tween average arms imports and average military expenditure as one would
expect. The correlations between the estimates and the variables are all
much lower. The strongest relationships are those with average military ex-
penditure:  0:33 for the intercept and +0:32 for the coe¢ cient of military
expenditure. This positive relationship between bi and mi is not consistent
with the inverted U shape indicated by the cross-section, which would lead
one to expect a negative correlation. The coe¢ cients of military expenditure
have a strong negative correlation with the intercept and a weak negative
relationship with the coe¢ cient of armed forces.
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Table 5. Correlation matrix, country means and coe¢ cients,
N=131




ypci 0.53 0.66 1
afpci 0.52 0.49 0.49 1bi 0.18 0.32 0.22 0.24 1bi -0.03 -0.04 -0.12 0.02 -0.28 1bi -0.15 -0.33 -0.20 -0.22 -0.88 -0.10 1
Other specications of the equations and of the determinants of the in-
dividual coe¢ cients, also provided no clear results. However, the results
are quite sensitive to specication. For instance, given that over this short
sample most of the series have strong trends, adding a time trend makes the
coe¢ cient of afpcit insignicant. We also considered various non-parameteric
and quantile regression estimators to try and identify the relationship, with
the same general conclusion: the non-linearity was apparent in the between
country cross-sections but not in the within country time-series.
6 Conclusion
When a country increases its military budget, the money can be spent on
personnel, the procurement of new weapons, or the operation of the existing
stock of arms. The procurement can be either from domestic producers or
foreign sources. This paper has tried to estimate the factors that determine
the elasticity of arms imports to military expenditures. We face the di¢ culty
that there is virtually no data on domestic arms procurement and domestic
production capability is almost certainly a crucial factor in determining the
import elasticity. We tried to avoid this di¢ culty by adopting a random
coe¢ cient approach to try to identify any systematic inuences that levels
of military expenditure, size of the armed forces or income may have on the
elasticity. Qualitative evidence suggests that there might be a non-linear
relationship: with growth in income and military expenditure causing the
import propensity to rise and then fall as a domestic arms industry devel-
oped. Such a pattern is apparent in the cross-section relationship. However,
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once one allows for heterogeneity such a pattern is not apparent. We consid-
ered a variety of homogeneous and heterogeneous models of the demand for
arms imports and considered the e¤ect of moving from a smaller balanced
panel with no zero observations to a larger sample. In this case classic sam-
ple selection bias arising from the zeros being censored made little di¤erence.
However, selecting a balanced sample did make a lot of di¤erence because
it excluded the countries where the level of military expenditure and im-
ports was low and where the relationship was very di¤erent from the higher
spending countries included in the balanced sample. In the larger sample,
the logarithm of armed forces per-capita, a measure of the capital intensity
of military provision was a signicant determinant, which it was not in the
balanced sample.
The nature of the data set also means that there are trade-o¤s in deciding
which aspects of the specication one wishes to emphasise and our approach
neglected dynamics, given the short time series available for some countries.
There clearly is a large amount of heterogeneity in the coe¢ cients and adopt-
ing a random parameter approach has the advantage that it draws attention
to the heterogeneity at the stage of model specication. In the introduction
we discussed the suggestion of Hall et al. (2009) to rst estimate a model
with coe¢ cients that are allowed to vary as a result of the fundamental mis-
specications in the model, and, then, to identify the specication biases that
are occuring in the underlying coe¢ cients and remove them.Unfortunately,
it is often easier to identify the symptoms of misspecication than to remove
them. The major indication of possible misspecication in our case was the
extreme and implausible range of coe¢ cients across countries, a common fea-
ture of heterogeneous panels. Allowing the coe¢ cients to vary over countries,
we tried to identify the reasons for the large di¤erences in estimates between
countries and to determine whether the di¤erences could be explained by the
non-linearity apparent in cross-section. While there was little indication of
within country non-linearity, this may be because our short time-series did
not contain enough within country variation in the explanatory variables for
any non-linearity to become apparent. Longer time-series or data on domes-
tic weapons procurement and production capability is probably necessary
for any clear conclusion. Despite the lack of clear conclusion, the random
parameter approach does seem a useful way to approach di¤erences between
time-series and cross-section patterns.
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